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Market share liability is the most recent product liability development in the area of 
intra-industry joint liability, in which all members ofan industry are sued. The various 
intra-industry approaches by which a consumer can recoverfor injuries are reviewed in 
this article, and their implications for marketing are examined. 
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Current litigation of claims against an entire industry, or its dominant 
members, has resulted in important developments in product liability law 
that, in turn, raise substantial implications for marketing. The most highly 
publicized and critically analyzed cases involve diethylstilbestrol (DES), a 
synthetic estrogen frequently prescribed between 1945 and 1971 for women 
to prevent miscarriages and other accidents of pregnancy [Sindell v. Abbott 
Labs 1980, Payton v. Abbott Labs 1979, Reed and Davison 1982]. Similar 
litigation has occurred or is pending with regard to asbestos [Insurance v. 
Forty-Eight 1980, Newsweek 1982, Wall Street Journal 1983], insulation 
[Davis v. Yearwood 1980], aluminum wiring [Beverley Hills 1979], leaded 
paint [U.S. News & World Report 1982], herbicides and pesticides [Business 
Week 1984, Newsweek 1984, Time 1984], and food additives such as nitrates 
and nitrites. 
The common factor in all of these cases is the exceptionally long lapse of 
time between product use and resultant injuries, making it very difficult for 
the plaintiff to prove which manufacturer(s) made the defective product. 
Given this problem of proof, the California Supreme Court developed a 
theory of recovery, called market share liability, in which DES manufac- 
turers were held liable for damages according to their relative market 
shares [Sindell v. Abbott Labs 1980]. Market share liability is the most recent 
development in the area of intra-industry joint liability in which several 
firms in an industry are sued simultaneously. 
The adoption of a market share liability approach may, however, lead to 
serious problems as it is applied to current cases. In addition, the rekindling 
of interest in intra-industry joint liability because of Sindell has resulted in 
the reexamination of earlier theories of joint liability by legal scholars 
[Leibman 1983, 1984, LaMarca 1982, Dworkin 1981a, HLR 1980, Sheiner 
1978]. In spite of having been developed several years ago [Steffen 1965, 
Harper and James 1956], these other theories of recovery from multiple 
defendants have not been adequately studied from a marketing perspective. 
Hence, this article first considers the nature of the DES situation to 
present the important elements of an intra-industry joint liability claim. 
Next, all of the approaches to joint liability are reviewed in the context of 
DES and other related cases. Finally, the implications of market share 
liability for marketing are discussed. 
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The Nature of the 
DES Problem 
An estimated one-half to two million women took DES between 1947, when 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved its use for prevention of 
accidents related to pregnancy, and 1971, when the FDA withdrew approval 
for use by pregnant women. As many as four million female offspring were 
exposed to DES [Henderson 1980, p. 143]. The FDA categorized DES as 
experimental and required it to be so labeled when distributed [Dworkin 
1981b, p. 77]. 
Although DES was considered both safe and effective at the time of its 
introduction, medical researchers subsequently discovered that daughters 
of DES users had an unusually high incidence of precancerous condition 
and rare forms of cancer. Nor was DES shown to be effective for the 
prevention of miscarriages. 
Somewhere between 94 and 300 companies produced DES during the 20 
years prior to the discovery of the drug's adverse consequences [Sheiner 
1978, p. 964]. No firm held a patent on DES because it was a generically 
marketed product, and pharmacists could fill prescriptions with the 
product of any manufacturer [Payton v. Abbott Labs 1979]. Many of these 
firms sold DES for uses other than, or in addition to, accidents of pregnancy. 
DES continues to be prescribed for a number of health-related problems. 
The above factors combine to create unique problems for DES plaintiffs 
who seek recovery in product liability litigation. When more than 100 firms 
have marketed a product which may have caused injuries which become 
apparent only after 10 to 20 years following plaintiffs' prenatal exposure, 
there are difficult problems regarding proof of facts. More specifically, a 
plaintiff will encounter difficulty in attempting to identify, perhaps 25 years 
after her mother had consumed the product, which pharmaceutical firm 
manufactured the drug that caused her injuries. 
All of these considerations relate to the issue of intra-industry joint 
liability: under what conditions may a plaintiff sue an entire industry, or 
the major members thereof, to assess liability for a defective product whose 
exact origin is unknown [Kroll 1979, p. 193]? Industry-wide liability was 
conceived initially as a technique for apportioning damages among several 
defendants, but only after a plaintiff had proven them all to be liable. 
However, recent decisions have begun to use industry-wide liability as a 
means of assisting the plaintiff to demonstrate liability [Abel v. Eli Lilly 
1980, p. 31, Sindell v. Abbott Labs 1980, pp. 614-22]. The resultant blurring 
of the damage apportionment and liability assessment functions can create 
considerable confusion. 
Such problems and disorder have led DES plaintiffs to attempt novel 
applications of traditional approaches to tort recovery and to propose new 
arguments upon which to base claims of joint liability [Mink v. University 
1978, Morrissy v. Eli Lilly 1979, Katz v. Eli Lilly 1979]. Some courts have 
responded by stretching the doctrines of alternative liability and concert of 
action in order to help plaintiffs overcome their problems of proof [Abel v. Eli 
Lilly 1980, Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly 1980]. Others have heard a variety of 
arguments on behalf of an enterprise liability approach [Sindell v. Abbott 
Labs 1980, Abel v. Eli Lilly 1980]. And California has opted for a market 
share basis for recovery [Sindell v. Abbott Labs 1980]. These four intra- 
industry theories of recovery are now described in detail. 
Approaches to Joint 
Liability 
Traditional approaches to joint tort liability include alternative liability and 
concert of action. At least one court has held that DES plaintiffs can bring 
actions under either of these theories [Abel v. Eli Lilly 1980]. 
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Alternative Liability A plaintiff seeking to establish joint liability under alternative liability must 
show that all defendants behaved wrongfully, even though only one caused 
the injury [Restatement 1965, 433B, comment f]. If the plaintiff proves this, 
then to escape liability any one defendant must show that he did not cause 
the injury [Ybarra v. Spangard 1944]. The classic case in this area is 
Summers v. Tice [1948], in which two hunters negligently shot in the 
direction of a third man, thereby injuring him. Each defendant was forced to 
try to show that his weapon had not caused the plaintiff's wound. 
A court will not find joint liability under alternative liability where not all 
defendants have been proven negligent [Wetzel v. Eaton 1973]. So when a 
fencer suffered an eye injury as the result of a defective sabre manufactured 
by one of two defendants, his action failed when he could not prove that both 
had acted negligently [Garcia v. Joseph 1978]. Likewise, the court rejected 
the plaintiff's argument for an outright application of alternative liability in 
Sindell because the plaintiff had named only 11 of the approximately 200 
firms which might have produced the injury-causing DES [Sindellv. Abbott 
Labs 1980, p. 602]. 
Concert of Action Concert of action offers a second possible approach to establish intra- 
industry joint liability. Under this theory, all those pursuing a common plan 
or design to commit a harmful act who (a) actively take part in it, (b) further 
it by cooperation or request, (c) lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, 
or (d) ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit are equally 
liable [Prosser 1971, p. 592]. 
Although drag races are the most frequently mentioned examples of 
concerted action [Bierczynski v. Rogers 1968], it could apply to product 
liability suits where the plaintiff can cite parallel actions by defendants in 
order to make inferences of a plan or tacit agreement [Orser v. George 1967]. 
Such actions might include manufacturing a product to common designs 
and specification, industry-wide activities with regard to product safety and 
warnings, and other common efforts, perhaps through a trade association, 
such as lobbying. At least one court has maintained, however, that a 
plaintiff must demonstrate some "joint control of the risk" by defendants to 
prove joint control [Hall v. DuPont 1972, p. 37]. Although the plaintiff need 
not establish a formal joint venture on the part of the defendants to prove 
joint control [Connor v. Great Western 1968], evidence of shared research, 
joint testing of products, and joint legislative lobbying or trade association 
should be provided at the very least. 
As with an assertion of alternative liability, concerted action on the part 
of the defendants shifts the burden of proof to them. In order to evade 
liability, any defendant must prove that its actions were not connected to 
the plaintiff's injury. 
In Sindell the defendants were charged with having (a) failed to test DES 
adequately, (b) not provided sufficient warnings, (c) relied upon the tests 
performed by one another, and (d) taken advantage of one another's 
promotion and marketing techniques. The court maintained that these 
allegations did not amount to a charge of tacit understanding or a common 
plan. Further, it could not be established either that each defendant knew 
the other's conduct was harmful to the plaintiff or that defendants had 
helped or encouraged one another with regard to inadequate testing and 
warning. 
Enterprise Liability Experts who disagree with the extension of traditional theories of joint tort 
liability to allow for industry-wide liability have proposed that courts adopt 
This content downloaded from 138.202.1.110 on Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:26:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Intra-Industry Joint Liability 75 
the enterprise liability doctrine [Sheiner 1978; Podgers 1980, Klemme 1976]. 
This approach would modify alternative liability in that a plaintiff would 
have to prove a "high probability" that the injury resulted from unjust 
behavior by one of the defendants. As described in one often-cited source, the 
specific elements of enterprise liability would be [Sheiner 1978, p. 995]: 
1. Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent and such 
liability is due to the nature of the defendant's conduct. 
2. A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the defen- 
dants. 
3. Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect. 
4. The defendant owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member. 
5. There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused by the 
product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants 
accounted for a high percentage of such defective products on the market at the 
time of the plaintiff's injury. 
6. There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety as to the 
manufacture of this product. 
7. All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whichever 
cause of action is proposed: strict liability, negligence, or warranty. 
Defendants unable to prove that their products could not have caused the 
injury would pay damages according to their market shares [Sheiner 1978, 
p. 994]. The justification for this enterprise liability basis for industry-wide 
liability rests upon the following policy argument [Sheiner 1978, pp. 
1002-4]: 
Where an entire industry, engaged in a predictably dangerous enterprise and 
following similar safety practices, places an identically defective product in the 
stream of commerce, the industry rather than the individual manufacturer 
should be the focal point for liability because it can best allocate risks, distribute 
costs, and take preventive measures. 
In Hall v. DuPont [1972], six explosives manufacturers and their trade 
association were held liable for injuries resulting from blasting cap 
accidents. The court said that where individual manufacturers could not be 
identified, the existence of industry-wide standards or practices could 
support a finding of joint control of the risk, thereby shifting to each 
defendant the burden of proving its product could not have injured the 
plaintiffs. The question of whose blasting caps caused the harm became 
secondary to the court's finding that defendants engaged in joint control of 
the risk. So in situations where a plaintiff cannot identify which defendant 
manufactured the harmful product and each defendant is equally unable to 
prove that its product did not cause the injury, liability will follow. 
The Hall court took care, however, to place some limits on the possible 
scope of its opinion [Hall v. DuPont 1972, p. 378]: 
By noting these requirements, we wish to emphasize their special applicability to 
industries composed of a small number of units. What would be fair and feasible 
with regard to an industry of five to ten producers might be manifestly 
unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of 
small producers. 
The Sindell court, using Hall for guidance, declined to apply enterprise 
liability to the DES situation for three reasons. First, at least 200 firms had 
marketed DES during the period in question while the six companies in Hall 
comprised virtually the entire blasting cap industry in the U.S. Second, 
DES manufacturers had not jointly controlled the risk via trade associa- 
tions. Last of all, the pervasive role of the FDA in setting criteria for testing 
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and marketing drugs made it unfair to impose liability without proof 
regarding who supplied the offending DES. 
Market Share Liability The California Supreme Court, under the new doctrine it designated as 
market share liability, sustained the Sindell plaintiff's cause of action by 
adapting the alternative liability rule described earlier [GLR 1981, Land and 
Melham 1981, Kroll 1980]. The market share approach to intra-industry 
joint liability includes at least the following elements [Sindellv. Abbott Labs 
1980]: 
1. Plaintiffs suffered injury because of a defectively designed product marketed 
by some unknown manufacturer. 
2. Plaintiff's inability to identify the specific manufacturer arose through no 
fault of his/her own. 
3. All manufacturers in the industry produced and marketed the same product 
with an identical design defect. 
4. Plaintiff joined as defendants those firms which accounted for "a substantial 
share of the market." 
If a plaintiff can establish the above elements, each defendant must then 
try to show that it could not have been the source of the harmful product. 
Since shifting this burden to defendants is tantamount to determining 
whether plaintiffs or defendants will most probably prevail, the court has 
apparently decided that the costs of DES injuries should be shared by those 
surviving DES producers whom plaintiffs can bring before a California 
court. The court relied on the Summers rationale that, as between an 
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost 
of injury [Brahn 1980]. 
Additional policy-based reasons offered for the Sindell decision included 
the belief that defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury and that 
manufacturers are in the best position to guard against defects and to 
provide warnings; therefore, holding them liable for not adequately per- 
forming those tasks provides an incentive for product safety [Burch 1982, p. 
789]. The court also noted the desirability of fashioning new remedies to 
meet the changing needs of a complex industrial society and corresponding 
necessity of adapting the rule of causation and liability [Sindell v. Abbott 
Labs 1980, pp. 601-11]. The court seemingly based its decision on policy 
grounds rather than having deduced it as the inevitable outcome of applying 
and extending existing legal doctrines to the DES problem. 
Implications of Joint 
Liability Litigation 
The court's general statement of the market share liability rule for the 
apportionment of damages in DES cases creates several serious difficulties 
for companies involved in such litigation. Moreover, implications for the 
marketing system arise from the potential explosive growth in the area of 
intra-industry joint liability. 
Difficulties in Applying 
Market Share Liability 
As articulated by the court, the market share rule provides that [Sindell v. 
Abbott Labs 1980, p. 612]: 
Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented 
by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the 
product which caused plaintiff's injuries.... 
Under this approach, each manufacturer's liability would approximate its 
responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products. 
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At the outset, this statement raises several questions about the appro- 
priate definition of "market share." Because manufacturers' market shares 
probably varied between 1947 and 1971, will different market shares apply 
for different plaintiffs according to when their mothers used DES? Or 
should an average market share be calculated for the entire period? If so, 
what about the fact that many firms produced DES for only part of the 
1947-to-1971 period? 
Market share issues also arise with respect to geographic area. Which 
market figures apply if a firm with a large share of the national market had a 
much smaller share within the state where the plaintiff's mother consumed 
the drug, or vice versa? This difficulty is compounded if some companies 
have gone out of business or operate beyond the reach of the courts within 
the state trying the lawsuit. 
The fact that several manufacturers marketed DES for uses other than 
the prevention of accidents of pregnancy further complicates the issue. 
Measuring market shares according to the total volume produced or sold 
could overstate the liability of firms whose product was used for other 
purposes. 
Additional market share computation problems may occur if the plain- 
tiffs bring pharmacists and drug wholesalers as defendants in DES actions 
along with manufacturers. The Sindell decision addresses only the division 
of liability on a horizontal basis, i.e., among manufacturers. Vertical 
allocations, i.e., among manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and 
retailers, lead to more complex problems. For example, a plaintiff might join 
as defendants four manufacturers with 60 percent of industry output, three 
wholesalers handling 35 percent of the product within the state having 
jurisdiction, and a chain store retailer that accounted for 15 percent of DES 
sales throughout the state. While the nonadditive nature of market shares 
on a vertical basis explains the 110 percent "total" market share figure, it 
still leaves the court without a market share rule in such cases. 
In a similar vein, the lack of specificity as to what constitutes a 
"substantial share of the market" on the part of DES codefendants may lead 
to other questionable consequences. Recovery is permitted from several 
defendants, each of whom may account for a relatively small market share, 
as long as their combined shares are deemed "substantial." The dissenting 
opinion in Sindell expresses serious reservations about the equity of this 
situation [Sindell v. Abbott Labs 1980, pp. 615-16]. 
Implications for 
Marketing 
The market share liability rule, to the extent that it applies to domestic drug 
manufacturers, makes the pharmaceutical industry an insurer of DES- 
caused injuries. The resulting exposure is potentially staggering. One New 
York court entered a $500,000 jury verdict for a DES victim in an intra- 
industry joint liability suit [Bichler v. Eli Lilly 1981]. While not all DES 
cases may be worth one-half million dollars, about four million women were 
exposed to DES [Henderson 1980, p. 143]. The implications of such 
outcomes, or even the prospect of such outcomes, for marketing are 
considerable and diverse. 
New Product Development The extension of liability for injuries which surface a generation after 
product use and for which causation need not be proven greatly increases 
the financial risk of introducing new products. One likely response to this 
situation will be more elaborate and expensive testing procedures prior to 
marketing such products. Further, duplicate testing of new products by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers is likely to occur to avoid the possibility of 
"jointly controlling the risk." 
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An additional implication is the inevitable rise in product liability 
insurance rates. Indeed, given the uncertainties involved in predicting risks 
and expected losses for this sort of liability, the risk may become unratable. 
The relatively underdeveloped state-of-the-art of generational testing of 
food and drug products further exacerbates the insurance problem. 
The net effect of these cost-raising factors will be the tendency of the 
pharmaceutical industry to slow product development, perhaps even 
abandoning controversial products because of the risks involved. But the 
potential impact of market share liability extends well beyond the pharma- 
ceutical industry. Consider the possibility of applying this doctrine to other 
widely-used chemicals, uch as asbestos. Asbestosis and similar espiratory 
diseases including lung cancer become apparent ten or more years after the 
initial exposure to the substance [Insurance v. Forty-Eight 1980]. Just as 
with DES, the injured person will probably be unable to identify the 
particular manufacturer who produced the offending product. Or, as is 
more likely to occur, the worker may have been exposed to asbestos upplied 
by several companies. 
Should the market share approach be extended to these asbestos-related 
injuries, substantial exposure on the part of the asbestos manufacturers 
would result. Over 3,000 different products contain asbestos, ranging from 
consumer items such as toothbrushes and hair dryers to industrial goods 
such as asphalt and concrete water pipes. An estimated eight to eleven 
million workers have been exposed to asbestos ince World War II began 
[Mansfield 1980, pp. 860-66]. The industry faces at least 5,000 bodily injury 
product liability suits in which defendants include manufacturers, distri- 
butors, and other suppliers [Mansfield 1980, p. 865]. 
Lawsuits arising out of use of herbicides and pesticides manufactured to 
identical formulas, leaded paint, aluminum wiring [Beverley Hills 1979], 
insulation [Davis v. Yearwood 1980] offer situations in which the market 
share liability doctrine seems to fit. Delayed reactions to any of these 
products are likely to leave plaintiffs in a position where, through no fault of 
their own, they cannot connect heir injuries with one specific producer. 
Generic labeling of nondurable products provides many other situations 
in which an injured person may not be able to identify the faulty product's 
manufacturer, specially if he/she purchased several unbranded versions of 
the product. Companies which feel confident that their products pose fewer 
risks to buyers, perhaps because of more thorough testing, may discard 
unbranded versions of their products in an attempt to lessen their product 
liability exposure via the market share approach [Land and Melham 1981, 
pp. 45-46]. 
Overall, then, new product development may decline in many industries 
where products are similar, especially if distinctive brand identities have 
not been established. 
Channel Integration The growth of market share liability litigation could lead to greater 
cooperation within the channel as well as attempts by the most vulnerable 
channel members to control channel operations. Thus, the tendency toward 
vertical marketing systems [Kotler 1980, p. 425] is likely to be stimulated. 
Fewer, larger manufacturer-distributor combinations will be better able 
to withstand the financial impact of intra-industry joint liability lawsuits. 
The economies of such large-scale operations may even allow the partici- 
pating firms to self-insure should intra-industry risks become unratable. 
Smaller firms unable to withstand the financial impact of such a suit will be 
either forced out of business or compelled to become members of 
substantially larger distribution channels. 
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Current problems experienced by a channel member in seeking 
indemnification from other members will also lead to increased channel 
integration. Eaton, the manufacturer in Wetzel v. Eaton [1973], an 
alternative liability case, experienced ifficulty in identifying which of two 
component parts suppliers had manufactured the part which had failed, 
causing Wetzel's injuries. Intra-industry joint liability theories of recovery 
are usually invoked when plaintiffs have no way of identifying the specific 
defendant whose product caused the injuries. But the court in Wetzel noted 
that Eaton clearly should have maintained records regarding which 
component supplier made the faulty part [ Wetzel v. Eaton 1973, p. 30]. Thus, 
even if they do not have records, manufacturers may be held to have such 
knowledge, preventing them from using joint liability theories to recover 
from their suppliers [Summers v. Tice 1948]. As a result, manufacturers 
may begin to monitor the actions of their suppliers more closely, perhaps 
demanding assurances about the quality of the supplied component or 
assuming some of the testing and inspecting functions. 
Marketing-Law Research Both marketing theorists and practitioners should begin to study a basic 
question relating to intra-industry joint liability: How will the definition of a 
fungible product change as courts begin to consider consumer behavior 
research? 
This question is actually one of perspective. Intra-industry theories of 
recovery are relevant when the injury-causing product cannot be traced to a 
particular company. Thus, the product is indistinguishable as to its source. 
If several firms use the same chemical formula or production process, the 
resulting products are said to be fungible [Nolan 1982]. But the viewpoint is 
that of the manufacturer. 
If courts begin to consider what products consumers regard as 
substitutes (a market-related efinition of fungible), more products could 
come under the scope of intra-industry liability [Dworkin 1981a, p. 80]. If 
products' brand identities are not established and if a particular product is 
destroyed, preventing the manufacturer from being named, while harming 
a user, what will the courts do? Perhaps opinion polls will show that this 
product belongs to a class of goods that consumers regard as being 
undifferentiated. As consumer behavior research gains acceptance in 
product liability litigation [Morgan and Avrunin 1981], the term "fungible" 
could take on expanded meaning, thereby broadening the scope of intra- 
industry liability. 
Summary The major implications for marketing of the evolving trends in intra- 
industry joint liability have been highlighted. The legal implications and 
problems have necessarily been simplified because of their technical 
complexity and lack of direct relevance. 
All of the issues mentioned seem to point to the need to balance the injured 
parties' rights to recover damages against the defendants' concerns about 
maintaining the extent of liability within reasonable bounds. Modern 
technology has brought about the production and marketing of increasingly 
sophisticated products which can cause injuries via complex, unprece- 
dented processes that may leave the injured party unable to identify the 
specific cause of the harm. As a matter of social policy, the law can allow 
those injuries to be borne by the parties which incur them or it can allow for 
some form of compensation by fashioning contemporary rules for recovery 
[Dworkin and Zollers 1982]. Since "the market is the ultimate laboratory, 
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and the consumer is the ultimate test subject" [Wilson 1980, p. 757], the 
latter option seems much more acceptable. 
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